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1. Introduction
If the central objectives of international law are to prevent or regulate conﬂ icts 
between sovereign political entities and to create conditions conducive for main-
taining or making peace, then one might say that its success is rather mixed. The 
largely normative body of reasoned law and legal injunctions are largely premised 
on the state system, on powerful state machineries controlling their armies as well 
as populations, and on the need for international monitoring and sanctioning re-
gimes that should effectively operate in case of ﬂ agrant transgressions. The 60 plus 
years of UN conventions and relevant international law treaties developed since 
World War II, mainly in Western, democratic countries, has shown that the reali-
ties of dispute, conﬂ icts of interest, or armed contestation about state legitimacy 
and power have led more than once to blatant disregard for the core principles of 
peaceful or lawful conduct among states and among insurgent movements. This 
may be explained by two general factors: ﬁ rstly, the weak power to enforce in-
ternational norms of conduct and of legal decisions or precepts, and secondly the 
deep-rootedness of the conﬂ icts of interest. The latter is tied up with notions not 
only of regime survival but also in some cases of state or people’s survival, i.e., 
‘realities’ that make international law – which almost by nature disregards local 
and historical subtleties and power relations – an option to either implement or 
to ignore or delay. Recent developments in international law, following the dis-
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course of political and economic globalization, increasingly show the elaboration 
of international humanitarian law, addressing problems of human security1 beyond 
the conﬁ nes and ‘needs’ of the existing states in the world system, and of third-
generation rights, e.g., those relating to self-determination. Needless to say, the 
chartered rights and laws are easily proclaimed, but difﬁ cult to observe. Darfur, 
since 2003 the scene of genocidal violence by Sudanese state authorities directed 
at the ‘African’ populations of this region, is only the most poignant case in point, 
with a death toll of more than 250,000 in ﬁ ve years with no solution in sight, and 
the UN or the major world powers incapable of acting efﬁ caciously.
The case discussed in this book, the Ethiopian-Eritrean conﬂ ict, ostensibly a 
‘border’ issue, is a case yet awaiting a ﬁ nal solution. Unless we take the problem 
as solved with the ‘virtual demarcation’ of the border based on the Decision2 of 13 
April 2002 of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and proclaimed 
on 30 November 2007.3 However, the boundary remains unmarked on the ground 
due to fundamental problems between the two protagonists in particular the refusal 
of Ethiopia to comply in full with the 2002 EEBC decision. 
In this essay I claim that despite the important and painstaking work done by the 
ﬁ ve ‘neutral’ international law experts on the EEBC no convincing and workable 
decision has been reached. This despite the observation that the Decision consti-
tutes in itself an important contribution to the development of international law 
per se, notably on the regulation of boundary disputes. From the fact that it has not 
brought the two parties together in a negotiating structure, has antagonized local 
populations, and has perpetuated the danger of armed conﬂ ict, it seems that there 
are ﬂ aws in its judgement. Some claim that the EEBC missed a great opportunity to 
bring the resolution of the conﬂ ict a decisive step forward.4 Many international le-
gal scholars of course argue that the decision is simply the best that could be made 
on the basis of the ‘pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law’ – 
the clause used in the Algiers Agreement of December 20005 – and the mandate of 
the EEBC to which the two countries agreed. But such legal decisions, although 
strongly normative and legally prescriptive, are often subject to dispute, not always 
ﬁ nding universal acclaim despite being defensible on purely legal grounds. Such 
acclaim tends to be reserved for international treaties and conventions on what 
1 See M. Kaldor, Human Security. Reﬂ ections on Globalization and Intervention (Cambridge, 
Polity Press 2007).
2 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border be-
tween The State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (13 April 2002). The 
Hague: Permanent Court of Arbitration (13 April 2002). Available online <www.pca-cpa.org/upload/
ﬁ les/EEBC-0.pdf>. 
3 See the press release of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission of 30 November 2007 (PCA 
6307) on: <www.pca-cpa.org/upload/ﬁ les/Press%20Release%202007-11-30.pdf>. 
4 See C. Clapham, ‘Notes on the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Demarcation’. Online on: <www.aiga-
forum.com/clapham0311.htm> (accessed 3 January 2008).
5 See for the text: <www.unmeeonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&
Itemid=50>.
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ought to occur in international relations, as the embodiments of the regulative ideas 
of international law held to govern the complex world of sovereign states. 
So it is with the EEBC decision of April 2002 and with the decisions of the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC), both instituted under the Algiers 
Agreement concluded in December 2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea after the 
devastating war that from May 1998 to July 2000 claimed at least 70,000 to 80,000 
lives and wrought enormous material destruction in both countries. Some observ-
ers6 even stated that decisions of the EECC undermined those of the EEBC.
2. History, Context and Law
This essay is prompted by the disagreement on the judgement made by the EEBC 
in the, apparently clear-cut case of the Ethio-Eritrean border, and later by some of 
the EECC decisions. If there is cause for dispute also among international legal 
experts, then there is room for discussion on the ultimate merits of the decision 
issued as well as on its impact on and relevance for the situation ‘on the ground’: 
in the states in question, for their future relationship, and, moreover, for the rights 
and well-being of the populations affected by the decision.7 
Any analysis of the thorny issue of ‘the boundary’ is faced with the difﬁ cult 
task of taking a proper distance from ofﬁ cial views (e.g., of the two governments 
involved) and of having an eye for the concerns and interests of the citizens of the 
two countries involved.8 Here I reﬂ ect on the issue from a more historical perspec-
tive and make some notes on the difﬁ cult relationship between (international) law 
and reality. Also, I will argue why, in view of highly relevant social and historical 
aspects of the boundary issue, the EEBC Decision is not the best that could have 
been made, and may in fact have perpetuated the conﬂ ict between the two coun-
tries.9 
In not reﬂ ecting political and power relations on the ground, and also omitting 
to give an implementation structure and not heeding the historical and social rights 
of the local peoples, the Decision has in fact produced a result that might be accept-
able in purely legal terms but defeats its own purpose. Needless to say, responsibil-
ity for the war itself and the impasse in relations since December 2000 lies mainly 
with the two governments, which are not known for democratic decision-making, 
6 C. Gray, ‘The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission oversteps its boundaries: A Partial Award?’, 
17 EJIL (2006) p. 721. 
7 As Massimo Toschi, Regional Minister of Cooperation, Dialogue and Conﬂ ict Management 
(Italy), said in his opening address to the conference in Pisa where this book has its origins: ‘People 
should not pay for the wrong decisions of their governments.’
8 This will be tried in this chapter. As Richard Reid says in his interesting paper ‘The Trans-Mereb 
Experience: Perceptions of the Historical Relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1 JEAS (2007) 
p. 253: ‘… research on the region should wean itself off the need to score political points, which is how 
so much scholarship has been constructed...’. I will try to follow Reid’s example.
9 These pages are only a brief reﬂ ection on an issue demanding a major, book-length study to do 
justice to the complexities of history and political machinations that led to the impasse and the deep 
enmity now produced.
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respect for human rights, or to seek consensus on normalisation. It is exactly this 
autocratic and ideologically rigid nature of the political regimes in these two coun-
tries, the incapability of dialogue and give-and-take in negotiations on such an 
extremely sensitive and psychologically anchored conﬂ ict, that should have been 
more properly reckoned with in the decision. The Decision seems to want to please 
both parties and does not convey the impression that one is more in the right than 
the other. It gives no incentives for bilateral negotiation and normalization, upon 
which a realistic implementation of any decision is dependent, a fact illustrated by 
the complete impasse between the two regimes in subsequent years. Ultimately, the 
process of normalization is an issue that the two governments, so closely related 
in outlook, common history, and military struggle against the pre-1991 regime in 
Ethiopia, will have to face and should be prepared for. They both agreed to do so 
in the mandate of the EEBC and the EECC in December 2000 following the Al-
giers Agreement.10 Talks on normalization would be and have been necessary in 
case of the immediate and full compliance of both countries with the arbitration as 
laid down in the 2002 Decision. In reality, we have seen it otherwise: a relentless 
propaganda struggle has unfolded on the level of the two political elites that have 
emerged from the two long-dominant political parties since May 1991.11 They are 
locked in a prestige psychological battle that now seems to amount to an effort to 
overthrow the ‘enemy regime’ as well as to vindicate their domestic position as 
sole political power. 
Historical perspectives on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border issue emphasize the 
inordinate complexity of the matter as well as the duplicity of all the parties in-
volved. Notably the Italians, who carved out their Eritrean colony from the Ethio-
pian political domain and were engaged in a 40-year effort of encroachment in the 
border area with Ethiopia were two-faced. But so were the British Mandate author-
ities (1941-1952), the Ethiopian imperial regime (controversially abrogating the 
UN-instigated federation with Eritrea in 1962), and especially the two post-1991 
governments. Excellent studies by G. Ciampi12 and by F. Guazzini13 provide ample 
evidence of this. In her essay in this volume, historian Federica Guazzini adds a 
10 Which was too hastily and optimistically assessed by outsider observers. See F. Jouannet, ‘Le 
règlement de paix entre l’Éthiopie et l’Érythrée: un succès majeur pour l’ensemble de l’Afrique?’, 105 
RGDIP (2001) pp. 849-896.
11 In Ethiopia the ‘Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front’ or EPRDF (dominated by 
the ‘Tigray Peoples Liberation Front’, or TPLF) that assumed power in May 1991, and in Eritrea the 
former ‘Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front’ (EPLF), renamed in 1994 as the ‘Popular Front for Democ-
racy and Justice’ (PFDJ). They are vanguard parties, similar in étatist political outlook and autocratic 
methods of governance via central planning and programmes, party cadre dominance in the civil 
service and the national administration, overwhelming control of the mass media, a party economy, 
and full control of the military.
12 G. Ciampi, ‘Componenti cartograﬁ che della controversia di conﬁ ne eritreo-etiopico’, 12 Bol-
letino della Società Geograﬁ ca Italiana (1998) pp. 529-50 and ‘Cartographic Problems of the Eritreo-
Ethiopian Border’, 56 Africa (Roma) (2001) pp. 155-189.
13 F. Guazzini, ‘La geograﬁ a variabile del conﬁ ne eritreo-etiopico tra passato e presente’, 54 Af-
rica (Roma) (1999) pp. 309-348 and Le Ragioni di un Conﬁ ne Coloniale. Eritrea 1898-1908 (Torino, 
L’Harmattan 1999).
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major contribution to our understanding of the political and historical complexi-
ties of the border arguments as well as to the controversial status of the so-called 
‘pertinent colonial treaties’ that were taken as a basis for the EEBC Decision. Her 
work and that of Ciampi show that a proper assessment of the colonial legacy of 
the border issue is crucial. The political duplicity and deliberate ambiguity – I fear 
especially on the part of the Italian colonizers of Eritrea (see below, and Guazzini’s 
essay) – have created a divisive legacy which is not easily to be disregarded. The 
fact that colonial treaties are the result of contested if not illegal action by a foreign 
conquering power in Northeast Africa should already in itself be a cause for deep 
reservation in accepting them at all. The so-called border problem is indeed an is-
sue of national identities and prestige or power politics between, ﬁ rstly, Ethiopia 
with a European colonizer angry and vengeful about its defeat at the hands of an 
African country (at Adwa in 1896), and subsequently between a problematic suc-
cessor state to the Italian colony of Eritrea and a restored imperial Ethiopia after 
World War II. The struggle for recognition and for re-drawing of state boundaries 
went on undiminished after the 1991 take-over of power in Ethiopia by two in-
surgent movements (see below). This was a long way from the amicable start of 
relations between the two regimes in that year.14
Another relevant aspect to consider is that of diverging conceptions of govern-
ance and law in the region (Northeast Africa). They are founded on customary 
law, imperial absolutist power, gaining (or enforcing) loyalty of local people to 
elites and forceful self-made leaders rather than on an unequivocal delineation 
of territory or on consensus and state sovereignty based on texts and treaties (cf., 
Clapham’s analysis, infra pp. 159-170), even less on rule-of-law ideas emanating 
from the (Western) legal tradition.
In this respect it is imperative to recognize the close interaction of the ‘human 
border’ and the physical-political border as they were perceived, developed and 
manifested on the ground.15 It is relevant to understand this interaction not only 
for the recent, post-April 2002 period, but for the entire historical trajectory of the 
region in question since the inception of the Colonia Eritrea in 1890. The various 
regimes have tried to carve out or claim borders usually without much concern for 
the people living in the area. We might say this still holds today.
The historical and socio-cultural links between Eritrea and Ethiopia are well-
known and may not require extensive comment. While areas across the Märäb 
(Mareb) river now known as Eritrea maintained signiﬁ cant autonomy from the 
14 Notably, in an interview in 1996, Eritrean president Isayas Afeworki had said: ‘As the relations 
are further strengthened and developed, our common borders shall have no meaning and our common 
interests shall have an upper hand on our individual interests’. He also said: ‘To claim that Eritrea 
existed as a political and geographical entity before 100 years and there existed an Eritrean national 
feeling would be an utter fallacy’ (ibid.) See: ‘Interview with Isaias Afeworki. Translated from Tigri-
gna by Amanios Mekonnen’, Assir (Magazine, Addis Ababa 1996) No. 1(3). Accessed on: <www.
eritrea.org/enic>, 8 June 1998, but removed since (the interview is referred to in Press Digest (Addis 
Ababa), No. 26, 27 June 1996).
15 Cf. Ciampi 2001, loc. cit. n. 12, p. 155; see also J. Abbink, ‘Creating Borders: The Impact of the 
Ethio-Eritrean War on the Local Population’, 56 Africa (Roma) (2002) pp. 447-458.
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Ethiopian imperial state since the demise of the Aksumite empire in the ninth cen-
tury CE, the region was usually within the orbit of the highland state until 1890, 
when Italy declared Eritrea a colony. This gave rise to a new, though always con-
tested territorial-national consciousness. Local identities were strong however, and 
unity in the sense of state or national identity as we anachronistically tend to deﬁ ne 
it had not developed.16 Several ethno-linguistic groups, such as the Tigrinya and 
the Afar and later the Kunama and the Irob straddled the border, while common re-
ligious faiths, kinship and economic relations linked the two regions, liked they did 
in Italian colonial times. Local social relations and disputes were regulated largely 
by customary law which kept its force next to the expanding role of codiﬁ ed law in 
both Eritrea and Ethiopia.17
Since the recent war however, the commonalities are no longer emphasised, 
notably from the Eritrean side. The independent status of Eritrea has been pointed 
out in strong political rhetoric by state/party authorities and even solidiﬁ ed in his-
torical and archaeological research as having existed ‘since ancient times’. In the 
aftermath of the conﬂ ict that concerns us here, the 1998-2000 border war, links 
of kinship, historical and cultural afﬁ nity and trade are broken. Memories of the 
actual conﬂ ict – the purposeful destruction of houses and churches, of ﬁ elds and 
irrigation systems, the abuse, killing and abduction of civilians, the hate displayed 
towards citizens of the ‘enemy country’ and the mutual expulsions have created 
a deep psychological rift. On the level of the political (party) elites in power in 
both countries who share a common core ideology and are both increasingly un-
popular, this will be a passing phenomenon. Among the wider population the rift 
will take a long time to heal. The EEBC Decision does not provide a solution for 
normalization because the effect has been to sow the seeds of enduring instability 
with its particular choice of border line, perhaps to the long-term detriment of both 
countries.18 The core issue is that it did not appeal to ‘applicable international law’ 
and almost exclusively made its case on the basis of ‘pertinent colonial treaties’.19 
From the purely legal point of view this is also a puzzling feature.
3. The Nature of the 2002 EEBC Decision in Socio-historical 
Context
3.1 The mandate
It was a unique fact that an arbitration commission was installed after Ethiopia won 
the war started by Eritrea.20 Though the country was the victim of armed attack 
16 Cf. Reid, loc. cit. n. 8.
17 Cf. Aberra Jembere, An Introduction to the Legal History of Ethiopia, 1434-1974 (Münster, 
Hamburg, Lit Verlag 2000).
18 See C. Clapham, ‘Notes on the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Demarcation’, loc. cit. n. 4.
19 As per the mandate mentioned in the Algiers Agreement, Art. 4(2).
20 That Eritrea had started the war was at least what the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 
(also installed under the Algiers Agreement) has stated in its Dispositif of 19th December 2005. See: 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum – Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8 (19 De-
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on 12th May 1998, after an ill-managed skirmish between Eritrean and Ethiopian 
militia on 6th May 1998 in the Badme (Badimme) area, leading to a devastating 
and costly war, Ethiopia’s government was willing to submit to a ‘ﬁ nal and bind-
ing’ arbitration on the border by an outside force, an arbitration commission hosted 
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.21 Accepting a restoration of the status quo 
ante as before May 1998 and renegotiating bilateral relations would also have been 
an option. This solution was seen as a major mistake, from which virtually all sub-
sequent problems were seen to emanate by many observers, and certainly by the 
Ethiopian public at large. The Algiers Agreement in which this arbitration clause 
was contained had also come like a bolt of lighting on the Ethiopian political scene 
after ﬁ ve months of silence. It was prepared behind the scenes and its nature and 
conditions were of course never democratically discussed in public in the Ethio-
pian parliament, the press, or other forums. It can partly be explained with refer-
ence to the deep-seated ideological kinship between the leaders of the TPLF and 
EPLF rebel fronts. They had been ﬁ ghting against the previous Ethiopian central 
government and its unitary conception of the state. Also the seniority of the EPLF 
over the TPLF, locked in an alliance that despite its moments of crisis had been 
quite resilient, played a role.22
Looking speciﬁ cally at the EEBC decision, a few observations could be made 
that put its ‘solution’ into perspective and assesses its contribution to international 
law and as a resolution of the actually existing conﬂ ict.
3.2 The use of evidence
A ﬁ rst general point emerging very clearly is that none of the so-called treaties 
and maps used in British-Ethiopian or Italian-Ethiopian negotiations since October 
1896 (date of the Addis Ababa Treaty after the Adwa defeat) is really helpful in 
determining the borders. Hardly any agreement was reached on the details. For ex-
ample, as Guazzini says of the 1900 ‘treaty’: ‘No geographical coordinates of the 
points between which the boundary was to run were given in the treaty’ (see supra 
pp. 109-139). Basically, not one successful, mutually agreed upon treaty or map 
was produced. This kind of situation holds for all treaties and proposals subsequent 
cember 2005). Online at: <www.pca-cpa.org/upload/ﬁ les/FINAL%20ET%20JAB.pdf>. However, it 
rejected Ethiopia’s claim that Eritrea ‘… was responsible for the whole war’.
21 Important to note: not the International Court of Justice, whose decision would have more 
authority in international law.
22 See ex-TPLF member Asegued Gäbre-Sellassie’s book Gahdi (Addis Ababa 2007, in Tigrinya), 
an insider account of the subject, and the amazing statements by a TPLF veteran and important Ethio-
pian ruling party member, Sebhat Nega, in a Dimtsi Woyane (TPLF radio station) interview of 28th 
May 2007, saying that: ‘On our part, we believe the people of Eritrea know very well – except a few 
members of the Shaebia leadership – that the EPRDF-led government of Ethiopia is the one and only 
force that would defend the independence of Eritrea. In short, the Eritrean people are very well aware 
of the fact that no force matches the power of the EPRDF-led government to defend and support the 
independence of Eritrea.’ He concluded: ‘Suppose let’s say Eritrea comes under invasion by an out-
side force. I’ve no doubt the EPRDF government would, along with the Eritrean people, ﬁ ght against 
the enemy of Eritrea’ (online on: <www.abbaymedia.com/TPLF_WakeUp_Call_to_Ethiopians.htm>). 
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to the 1900 text. No ﬁ nal decisions of any kind were made or recognized by both 
contenders. 
It is relevant instead to take those ‘colonial maps’ and their history as political 
artefacts, embedded in a competitive political game between the regimes in place 
and to recognize their artiﬁ cial, iconic and indicative role in the changing power 
conﬁ gurations between regimes, as opposed to between peoples or citizens of the 
states in question.23 It is already remarkable that in 2000 the two regimes, both 
led by a former insurgent movement that catered to a speciﬁ c constituency, acqui-
esced in submitting to international arbitration on the basis of partly ﬁ ctitious and 
outdated treaties lacking clarity and status. These were all abrogated by the Italo-
Ethiopian Peace treaty of 1947. It was no doubt an exercise of political legitimacy, 
construction and state consolidation, especially on the Eritrean side.24 On the side 
of the Ethiopian government no doubt a major mistake was made, the results of 
which continue to haunt the EPRDF regime, especially as it seems that it did not 
properly do its homework, leaving out essential evidence and ceding too much 
beforehand to the Eritrean position.25 A barrage of critique has landed upon them, 
from the general public, from researchers and analysts, and from (former) associ-
ates who disagreed with them.26 Despite its rhetorical acceptance of the decision 
in full in November 2004 (via the ‘Five Point Peace Plan’), the current Ethiopian 
government cannot and will probably never accept the EEBC Decision as it stands: 
if Badme and a large part of the Irob area, undisputedly under de facto Ethiopian 
administration since Italian times,27 are to be formally Eritrean, domestic unrest 
will grow and the regime will have ‘lost the war’ and the battle for prestige, so 
important in this part of the world.28 As to the Irob area this is more than ironic 
because the Irob never ﬁ gured as one of the nine ofﬁ cially recognized ‘nationali-
23 Cf. Ciampi, loc. cit. n. 12; Guazzini, loc. cit. n. 13.
24 Cf. J. Abbink, ‘The Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute’, 97 African Affairs (1998) pp. 551-565.
25 See the critical comments made on this by the EEBC in its 2002 Decision, supra n. 2, at 
pp. 21 and 50.
26 E.g., from lawyer Tecola Hagos, Ph.D., a former TPLF member, in his strongly expressed com-
ments on the EEBC on <www.tecolahagos.com/editorial_sebhat_nega.htm> (accessed 2 February 
2008).
27 See also A. Vascon, ‘Eritrea – Bademmè e la questione dei conﬁ ni con l’Etiopia’ (2003) p. 10. 
Online on: <www.ilcornodafrica.it/gt-bad1.htm> (accessed 8 November 2007).
28 The Irob case, underexposed in the debates about the EEBC Decision, is perhaps even more 
painful that the Badme issue, because this people is to be divided into two parts, and many locals will 
have to live under a regime that killed many and destroyed their houses, churches, ﬁ elds and irriga-
tion systems in the course of the 1998-2000 war (see A. Waters-Beyer, ‘Participation in suffering’, 
1998. Online report on: <www.geocities.com/~dagmawi/News/News_Aug6_Tigrai.html>; Irob Com-
munity of North America, ‘Ethio-Eritrean boundary delimitation: the Irob case’. Online on: <www.
geocities.com/malula86/irob.html> (accessed 8 February 2004). In the Irob case the principle of self-
determination was clearly ﬂ outed, apart from the questionable decision by the EEBC against applying 
the effectivités of Ethiopian authority mainly on the basis of Italian documents and information. Italian 
Eritrea-governor Corrado Zolli, writing about the controversial status of Irob country and of Italy’s 
claims on it (C. Zolli, ‘Un territorio contestato tra Eritrea ed Etiopia. Escursioni nel paese degli Iròb’, 
8 Bollettino della R. Società Geograﬁ ca Italiana (serie VI, No. 10, 1931) pp. 715-746, would have 
been very happy with the EEBC decision.
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ties’ (ethnic groups) of Eritrea. In addition, an important Italian map of 193129 of 
the Irob area shows the entire Irob country including Endeli as part of Ethiopia, 
with the remark ‘conﬁ ne di fatto attuale’, a situation which has not changed since 
1931.30
There are also other factual errors in the EEBC’s judgement. I mention a few 
only to indicate the unresolved problems of interpretation and the wide scope for 
alternative readings of map evidence which was very uneven and indecisive. It 
is for this reason that more reliance on ‘applicable international law’ would have 
been preferable. In referring to this matter, the following statement in the Decision 
is unconvincing: 
‘As it turned out, the Court [the International Court of Justice] found in that case that 
there was insufﬁ cient prescriptive conduct to affect its interpretation of the treaty. But 
what matters for present purposes is that the Court read the applicable law clause be-
fore it as including recourse to such rules of customary international law. – i.e., consid-
ering customary international law rules.’31 
In the Decision and in a letter of 7th October 2003 from the EEBC chairman,32 it is 
suggested that the maps offered, including the unilaterally marked-up Italian map 
of 1935 claiming Eritrean territory up to the Mai Tomsa (point 6), was agreed upon 
by Ethiopia and Italy.33 But, as Guazzini argues, this was not the case. Hence, one 
cannot say on the basis of a map drawn up by Italy that ‘… the title of Eritrea […] 
had crystallized as of 1935’.34 How such a misconception can then become the 
basis of a boundary decision is rather puzzling. 
A very telling Italian map of 1929 (see appendix to this book35), not properly 
considered by the EEBC, shows the extent of the claims by Italy after more than 20 
years of encroachment efforts on Ethiopian territory. Even there, the Badme area 
(or rather the ‘Badumma’ plain, at that time there were no villages) is not claimed. 
The Italian claim line ends at the Meeteb stream (one of three) west of the Tomsa 
stream. What is more important, the limits of effective Italian occupation at the 
29 Cited in Ciampi 2001, loc. cit. n.12, ﬁ g. 12. It was made for their own purposes.
30 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
31 EEBC Decision, supra n. 2, para. 3.14, p. 25. In this 1999 Kasikili/Sedudu case the parties by 
agreement prescribed that the decision should be made ‘on the basis of the ... Treaty ... and the relevant 
principles of international law’. The Court decided that the words ‘and the relevant principles of in-
ternational law’ were not limited in their effect to the international law applicable to the interpretation 
of treaties; they also required the Court to take into consideration any rules of customary international 
law that might have a bearing on the case (ibid., p. 24).
32 Sir E. Lauterpacht, ‘Letter of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission to His Excellency 
Koﬁ  A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations’, 7th October 2003.
33 Section 8 of the letter says: ‘The Commission was convinced that these [maps] showed the Par-
ties’ agreement upon an interpretation of the relevant Treaty which placed the boundary prescribed by 
that Treaty in the location determined by the Commission.’ 
34 EEBC Decision, supra n. 2, para. 5.95, p. 84. Compare also p. 93, paras. 5.90-95.1: a ﬁ ctitious 
claim. 
35 In: Bahru Zewde, ‘The Ethio-Eritrean Border/Boundary: a Seesaw Puzzle’, 3-4, 3 Medrek – 
FSS Bulletin (Addis Ababa 2006) facing p. 5. 
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time are indicated again to the west of that, along a line from the Sittona river to 
Mai Anbässa (the uncontested point of conﬂ uence with the Märäb), and not the 
Tomsa. In 1929-1935 Ethiopia did not reach agreement with Italy on any other 
maps produced.
The location of Fort Cadorna as per the EEBC Decision (and the line between 
points 14 and 18 on the Western sector map) is most likely wrong being 20 km. 
too much to the south. In a letter by the EEBC chairman of 21st March 2003 (Sec-
tion 23),36 this is admitted more or less, on the basis of the EEBC having received 
‘insufﬁ cient information’. But it is glossed over with reference to Articles 28 and 
29 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. For the Commission the boundary line 
in the region (Acran) would not be affected by it due to the remarkable Ethiopian 
submission to the EEBC that Fort Cadorna was part of ‘mostly … undisputed Eri-
trean places’.37 But this is contestable to say the least.
For the central area, the EEBC Decision rightfully hints at the inordinate com-
plexity and confusion existing in maps and reports on river names and courses,38 
especially the triad ‘Märäb-Bäläsa-Muna’ or the ‘Muna/Berbere Gado’. For ex-
ample, the 1900 Treaty map, the only map ever attached to the three ‘pertinent’ 
colonial treaties and therefore given (too) much value by the EEBC,39 mentioned 
a stream with the name ‘T. Mai Muna’. In reality its name and course could not be 
identiﬁ ed with any certainty on the basis of subsequent maps and reports. A focus 
on the Muna to determine the boundary is not helpful.40 Closer study of all the 
evidence reveals that the problem of river courses and boundaries notably in the 
Irob area has not been solved by the EEBC – and could not without a solid ﬁ eld 
study.41 Here the weakness of the Ethiopian submission to the EEBC may also 
have contributed, as it apparently did not present tax records, court case evidence, 
etc. showing the historical orientation of the Irob towards Tigrayan (Ethiopian) 
authorities in the Agame region and not to Italian-colonial authorities.42
As to Badme: this issue has been discussed ad nauseam and will not be gone 
into here except to note that Eritrea was not able to bring any real evidence of its 
administrative presence in the area. The village was founded in 1951 under the 
Ethiopian administration in Ras Seyoum Mängäsha’s time (administrator of Tigray 
region). Before the 1998 war Eritrea did not bring up the case of Badme as being 
Eritrean. It was not a Kunama village,43 but settled by Tigrayans. There were two 
36 See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Observations of 21 March 2003 (Addendum to 
the Progress Report of the UN Secretary-General, UN doc. S/2003/257 of 6 March 2003), online at: 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXV/216-224.pdf>.
37 EEBC Decision , supra n. 2, p. 50.
38 Ibid., pp. 33, 35, and 39.
39 Reproduced as Map 5, EEBC Decision, supra n. 2, p. 31.
40 Cf. also Bahru Zewde, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 5.
41 See also the EEBC’s admission in its letter of 23rd March 2003, section 25 (cited in the source 
supra n. 35).
42 Cf. Bahru Zewde, loc. cit. n. 35 at p. 7.
43 As mistakenly assumed by A.M. McHugh, ‘Resolving International Boundary Disputes in Af-
rica: A Case for the International Court of Justice’, 49 Howard Law Journal (2005) p. 215.
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Ethiopian customs posts northwest of Badme before 1998.44 In the Yemen-Eritrea 
arbitration case on the Hanish Islands, the PCA, in a major piece of jurisprudence, 
elaborated on the need for ‘intentional display of power and authority’ over effec-
tivités in the area.45 No such Eritrean display was evident in the case of the Badme 
area.46 Therefore the EEBC reverted to the old colonial maps, at the detriment of 
Ethiopian evidence for its display of authority. Ethiopia, however, had held elec-
tions in Badme since the 1960s. The place participated in the Ethiopian censuses of 
1984 and 1994. In the 1960s the World Bank funded an agricultural project in the 
area to the tune of USD 20 mln, administered by Ethiopia.47 Ignoring this evidence 
and reverting to the (unilateral Italian) maps as authoritative has a weak basis: can 
this really be accepted as part of the development of ‘applicable international law’?
The implication of the fact that apparent errors were made in this judgement, 
whatever the quality of the legal reasoning and the marshalling of accepted tenets 
of international law, is potentially far-reaching. Can these errors stand as still valid, 
and can a border be demarcated on the basis of them? Not only the conclusion that 
we have res judicata here is questionable. More important, it is likely that realities 
on the ground will continue to further generate conﬂ ict.
In a general sense, the very fact of the shaky status of the maps makes doubtful 
any contemporary decision as to which treaty or map is pertinent, and what inter-
national law should be applicable. Any decision is very much dependent not only 
on detailed negotiations in good faith between two governments (preferably with a 
democratic, i.e., widely supported mandate), but even more so on the views of po-
litical loyalty, governance, interests and identity of the people living in the frontier 
areas. They know the human geography, the trade routes, the social systems, the 
customary rights and duties. We all know that the EEBC has not considered these, 
either because of the mandate given to it, or due to a lack of sufﬁ cient fact-ﬁ nding. 
It did not carry out any solid ground survey, interviews or local document and data-
gathering, but relied on border area satellite / aerial photo information. Whatever 
the legal reasons for this, a satisfactory decision would at least have come up with 
more than an analysis of the archival material, secondary documents and strict 
reasoning on the basis of international law devoid of contextual referents. 
44 Notably, in the Bure area in the Eastern sector, there was in 1994 one Eritrean checkpoint or 
customs facility in contested territory with Ethiopian permission. This was seen as sufﬁ cient evidence 
of Eritrean effectivité in the area because Ethiopian and Eritrean governments of the day appeared to 
see it as their border. Purely to see it as such on the basis of this evidence is doubtful. But the chunk of 
territory was assigned to Eritrea. See EEBC, supra n. 2, para. 6.32.
45 See PCA, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Territorial Sov-
ereignty and Scope of the Dispute), between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Yemen, 1996, The Hague 1996, p. 18 (para. 68) p. 78 (para. 269) p. 94 (para. 
341) p. 97 (para. 361) and p. 142 (para. 507) (online at: <http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/ﬁ les/EY%20
Phase%20I.PDF>).
46 Although the two insurgent movements EPLF and TPLF made some informal deals on the divi-
sion of the area in the 1980s.
47 Mentioned by former governor of Tigray ras Mängäsha Seyoum in a Memo of December 2004 
(in Amharic), online at: <www.ethiopiaﬁ rst.com/news2004/Jan/Letter_By_Ras_Mengesha.pdf>. Ex-
tant documents on this were not submitted by Ethiopia.
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I give one example of why this latter aspect is important. In 1909, Emperor 
Menelik II of Ethiopia (r. 1889-1913) gave grazing rights to local (probably Ku-
nama) people from Italian-held Eritrea in the Ethiopian-administered localities of 
Shilalo and Shäshäbit, i.e., across the (unmarked) border. This of course did not 
imply a transfer of sovereignty: the Emperor granted these rights without any legal 
implications and out of magnanimity. In later years, well after his death in 1913, 
the Ethiopians had trouble in getting this land back under their sovereignty. The Ti-
grayan ruler ras Mängäsha Seyoum appealed to Emperor Haile Sellassie to ask that 
the Eritrean authorities give it back,48 to no avail of course. This fact of ‘Eritrean 
presence’ in Tigray (Ethiopia) was used and was even, from a Western point of 
view, legal, an effectivité that could be used to bolster a claim to sovereignty over 
the area.49 But it was not from a local customary-law point of view.
The fault of not fully exploring the contextual meaning and the ground data or 
the ideas and practicalities of the border as ‘lived’ by local communities is as much 
that of the two countries (notably Ethiopia). The mandate given is too limited or 
constraining, obviously without considerations of ex aequo et bono, ‘according to 
what is equitable and just.’50 But then, nothing would have prevented the Com-
mission from making a few bold moves – on the basis of ‘applicable international 
law’ providing judicial discretion – to gather more material itself (maps, colonial 
reports, government archival evidence, testimonies from local people, expert in-
formants and political decision makers from imperial times) and not being depend-
ent on what the two countries gave them. They could also have come up with a 
more innovative and defensible solution thus reﬂ ecting realities on the ground and 
making a contribution toward conﬂ ict resolution in a wider sense – which, despite 
the intrinsic challenges for further developing the discipline of international law, 
was the ostensible aim of the exercise.
48 This case was also mentioned by the former administrator of Tigray, Mängäsha Seyoum, see 
previous note.
49 As was done in the EEBC decision: Shilalo and Shäshäbit are seen as part of ‘undisputed Er-
itrean territory’.
50 As the EEBC rightly says in its Eighth report of 6th March 2003 (online at: <www.pca-cpa.org/
upload/ﬁ les/Mar.%20SG%20report%20-%20ﬁ nal%20version.pdf>) : ‘… the December 2000 Agree-
ment expressly precluded the Commission from deciding matters ex aequo et bono: it did not confer 
on the Commission, as it could have done and as has been done in the demarcation arrangements for 
many other boundaries, the power to vary the boundary in the process of demarcation for the pur-
pose of meeting local human needs. Absent such authority, the hands of the Commission are in large 
measure tied. The Commission regrets that the boundary lines found by it to follow from the Treaty 
provisions and international law which it is bound to apply may at certain points result in physical 
divisions within communities that may adversely affect the interests of the local inhabitants. The Com-
mission has not been insensitive to certain likely problems; it expressly contemplated the possibility 
of variations to the line, but only at the request of and with the agreement of both Parties. While the 
Parties have not reached such agreement, nothing would preclude their doing so in the course of the 
demarcation, even on a location-by-location basis.’ [Emphasis added]
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3.3 The reference to ‘applicable international law’
As per its mandate, the EEBC had the possibility of referring to applicable inter-
national law. To do so would have been particularly apposite in this historically 
complex case, where notions of state law, international law, local customary law, 
and political competition intermingled. It made a straightforward interpretation of 
‘pertinent colonial maps’ – all of dubious status – very difﬁ cult. In the Decision, 
however, little due relevance was given to uti possidetis and effectivités in the 
context of state relations over the past century.51 But realities on the ground – set-
tlement, economic activities, customs posts activity, court proceedings, etc. were 
going on in the area for decades. The border between Italian Eritrea and Ethiopia 
up to 1941, as well as in later periods up to 1962 when the federation was abro-
gated was never delineated or demarcated.
These realities should have been considered for the period from the late 19th 
century up to 12th May 1998, the start of the armed conﬂ ict, and the consideration 
of uti possidetis in combination with historic sovereignty rights would ﬁ nd ac-
ceptance in a judgement. The uti possidetis principle emerged in Latin America to 
regulate borders between newly independent states after the Spanish colonization 
ended and, indeed, worked rather well. In Africa one of the most cited cases was 
the decision by the International Court of Justice in the case of the Burkina-Faso/
Mali boundary (1986), on the basis of which uti possidetis was declared to be a 
general principle of international law, not only a special rule.52
It is important to note that although the principle of uti possidetis is now rec-
ognized as ‘a rule of international law applicable generally with regard to the phe-
nomenon of decolonization, it remains to be determined whether it is a principle 
applicable to all situations of independence, irrespective of the factual situation’.53 
This holds for Ethiopia and Eritrea. The latter did not exist before 1890 when Italy 
detached it from Ethiopia - despite the strong autonomy of the region - and the 
idea to ‘keep what you have’ at the time of independence is difﬁ cult to determine: 
was this at ‘independence’ in 1941, when the Italian colony reverted to the UN and 
became a British mandate? Or was it the situation in 1962, when Eritrea’s existence 
as an independent member of the federation with Ethiopia was ended, or was its 
independence in May 1991 (formally declared on 24th May 1993) after the armed 
victory over the Mengistu regime? The issue is problematic because at the time 
(1964) that the OAU Charter afﬁ rmed uti possidetis for ex-colonies Eritrea was a 
part of Ethiopia and not a colony in the legal sense. Especially with regard to the 
question of Ethiopia’s access to the sea (its former port of Assäb, built and used by 
Ethiopia mainly in the period after the genesis of the ‘pertinent colonial treaties’) 
these questions are important although they did not get adequate treatment in the 
51 And even less to ﬁ nding whether and how uti possidetis juris and uti possidetis de facto might 
be congruent or clash in this particular case of Ethiopia (as the pre-existing country from which Eritrea 
was carved out in 1890).
52 Cited in M. Shaw, ‘People, Territorialism and Boundaries’, 8 EJIL (1997) pp. 478-507.
53 Shaw, loc. cit. Online version: <www.ejil.org/journal/Vol8/No3/art6.pdf>, p. 15.
154 jon abbink
EEBC Decision.54 The Assäb issue would have brought in law relating to the exer-
cise of historical sovereignty.
Other relevant applicable law already mentioned, and related to the uti possi-
detis issue, would be that relating to the exercise of self-determination of peoples in 
the border area (see next section). Uti possidetis when strictly applied would have 
the territorial consideration prevail over issues of human rights of minorities that 
face new problems as a result of new divisive borders.
3.4 The interpretation of evidence
On what counts as evidence the EEBC has made many steps in its reasoning that 
do not accord with historical facts, or gives a very speciﬁ c, often contestable, inter-
pretation of them. As we saw above, with regard to the most contested part of the 
boundary around Badme, the EEBC in a remarkable move, chose to draw a straight 
line between the Mai Anbässa-Märäb conﬂ uence (point 9) and the Tomsa (point 6). 
The straight line in actual practice was never a real boundary that was observed: it 
was an area to be demarcated. The Italian authorities in Eritrea always prevented 
this from happening: this was to be expected on the basis of their colonialist aims. 
The line was supposed to be sorted out by consultations and consideration of facts 
on the ground and subsequently marked between the two points hypothetically 
connected. It is puzzling that the EEBC saw ﬁ t to just to copy the line and plot it 
on the map as ‘the boundary’. Italy never administered the area to the west of the 
line,55 let alone east of it. Ethiopian activities, however, were increasingly evident 
on the western side since the early 1900s.
Of course, a legally defensible decision on the border dispute can be made with-
out an appeal to ex aequo et bono principles – which are only very reluctantly used 
in international law disputes56 – and without taking note of the human border or 
the situation on the ground. But the result is instability and a heightened chance 
for the renewal of violent conﬂ ict, which a comprehensive arbitration decision was 
meant to prevent. 
This is most evident in the case of the Irob people (see note 28) and above. 
The proposed boundary line cuts across their land, ﬂ outs their right to self-deter-
mination and pre-empts their overwhelming preference to remain an undivided 
people and citizens of one state, based on historical afﬁ nity and communal identity. 
One could refer to the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission (Badinter Commission), 
54 Perhaps because the Ethiopian leaders did not raise them; cf. the IRIN news message (11th 
February 1998) on a statement of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘Ethiopia dismisses calls 
for sea outlet’.
55 Although, as we saw above, Emperor Menelik II had given grazing rights to Eritrean-adminis-
tered people in Ethiopian-held territory.
56 Perhaps justiﬁ ably so, as they lead quickly into politics and allegedly introduce non-legal ele-
ments. Cf. also McHugh, loc. cit. n. 43, at p. 222. But the scope of application of ex aequo et bono 
could be extended: see L. Trakman, ‘Ex Aequo et Bono: de-mystifying an ancient concept’. University 
of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper No. 39 (online:< http://law.be-
press.com/unswwps/ﬂ rps/art39>. In: 9 Chicago Journal of International Law, 2008) p. 621.
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which opined in 1991 that the rights of minorities are part of jus cogens and thus 
comprise a right to recognition of their identity under international law or the right 
to choose their nationality.57 While this is controversial, it shows at least that there 
was and is leeway for creative interpretation, for doing justice to realities on the 
ground. However, the Irob problem will now remain another aspect of instability 
in the border region and must be solved in another, probably political, common-
sense manner. 
Excluding ex aequo et bono reasoning does not prevent an arbitration commis-
sion from gathering relevant facts on the ground. While the EEBC has used recent 
satellite images and other ﬁ eld material on the disputed areas, it never has carried 
out proper fact-ﬁ nding missions in the three sectors that would have permitted it to 
develop its legal arguments with reference to ‘applicable international law’.
There was, therefore, the need for an assessment not only of the international 
legal aspects of this century-old conﬂ ict (engendered by Italian colonial conquest), 
but also of the political consequences of this history and of the opportunistic and 
authoritarian actions taken by the various regimes that have been, or still are, in 
place and that are not marked by serious democratic decision-making or sufﬁ cient 
respect for people’s rights. The rule-of-law fares best in democratic states. Fur-
thermore, if the development of an important piece of international law, as in the 
case of a boundary decision, is constrained too much by a basically political and 
problematic mandate given to the arbitrators by certain governments, its scope and 
impact will be seriously limited. This happened with the EEBC.58 In the case of 
its twin commission, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, a more bold and 
independent step was taken.
3.5 A possible contradiction with the ﬁ ndings of the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission?
In its award of 19th December 2005, the EEBC said that: 
‘… [Eritrea] violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations by 
resorting to armed force on May 12th, 1998 and the immediately following days by at-
tacking and occupying the town of Badme, then under peaceful administration by the 
Claimant, as well as other territory in the Claimant’s Tahtay Adiabo and Laelay Adiabo 
Weredas.’59 
57 This was Opinion no. 2 (1991); cf. Shaw, loc. cit. n. 52, at p. 506 in his note 130.
58 Interestingly, K.H. Kaikobad concludes: ‘… the fact that the Parties were unable to accept the 
delimitation carried out by the Commission shows that this dispute settlement procedure ought not to 
have been embarked upon in the ﬁ rst place. Attempts at political solutions and settlements are better 
in this sort of hostile environment wherever possible’ (infra pp. 171-223).
59 EECC, Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum – Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8, as cited supra n. 20. It also said: 
‘… The Claimant’s [Ethiopia] contention that subsequent attacks by the Respondent along other parts 
of their common border were pre-planned and coordinated unlawful uses of force fails for lack of 
proof.’
156 jon abbink
This judgement has been contested. In the present book, we ﬁ nd two views on the 
EECC decision regarding Ethiopia’s jus ad bellum. E. Greppi, supra pp. 55-77) ar-
gues similarly to Gray, who perhaps exaggerates the point60  that this commission 
is ‘disappointing’ and ‘quite unsatisfactory’. It allegedly did not relate to the earlier 
EEBC Decision and according to him contributed to the Ethiopian Government’s 
refusal of the latter. Apart from this being questionable in view of the strong and 
continuous focus of Ethiopia on Badme, it is also the question of whether the rea-
soning of the EEBC is faulty and whether it has no relevance for the issue of claims 
awards. Greppi’s analysis does not discuss the facts of the May 1998 incidents (or 
the views on them).
In this book, J.R. Weeramantry, in contrast, and equally plausible from a legal 
point of view, argues the opposite, saying that the EECC’s Partial Award ‘… ﬁ nd-
ing is sound in law and contains a good deal of common sense’, and ‘…appears 
consonant with international law’, conﬁ rming the role of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter (see infra). 
What are the decision criteria here to make the Award an acceptable or unac-
ceptable piece of law? The facts appear to support Weeramantry: escalation was 
provided on 12th May 1998 by a massive Eritrean campaign with several brigades 
and occupation of territory in response to an armed incident. Is this ‘contradiction’ 
between carefully drawn up judgements insurmountable and would it invalidate 
any of the two dispositifs? What is more important is whether these EEBC and the 
EECC decisions bear any signiﬁ cant relationship. Would the admission that Eritrea 
is responsible for the initial phase of war, giving Ethiopia a right to self-defence, 
have any direct bearing on the question to whom, for instance, Badme belongs? 
No, as the decision on this in the ﬁ nal instance must be based on evidence of 
effective rule, credible and mutually accepted maps, historical claims, and local 
people’s adherence to political and civic identity. The answer to the question is 
only important (contra Greppi) for determining the responsibility for compensa-
tion payments regarding the Western sector.
Again, by its being contested with a number of perhaps equally valid arguments 
from an international legal point of view, the issue of the boundary appears to be 
an eminently political issue, hinging on the future relations between two countries 
so closely connected in social, cultural and historical terms. It suggests that – bar-
ring another big war – only a mature, democratically supported political solution, 
to be reached through negotiations and consultation of local populations as to self-
determination, can bring about stability, and that any legal judgment or arbitration 
must in some way encourage that political aspect.
4. Conclusion: International Law Refi ned, Stalemate 
Confi rmed
If the intention of arbitration is to prevent conﬂ ict and further the maintenance 
of peace between states, the development and interpretation of international law 
60 Gray, loc. cit. n. 6.
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on boundary issues, next to developing extant bodies of law and legal reasoning, 
would beneﬁ t from taking into account, if only cursorily, the historical context, 
the local political setting and power struggles, the local perceptions on territorial-
ity and governance, and the socio-ethnic composition of the disputed regions. If 
a meaningful contribution to the development of international law norms is to be 
made, it will neither do to ignore questions of justice, to bypass customary law and 
to remain within the often strict conditions imposed by the parties requesting arbi-
tration when preparing the decision, nor adhere dogmatically to a restrictive man-
date given to an arbitration commission by state regimes with manifest political 
aims that function so to speak, to capture and co-opt international law. In a wider 
perspective, more explicit considerations could also be given to emerging issues of 
humanitarian concern and human security that affect ordinary citizens other than 
states or state elites.61 
The EEBC Decision was ‘ﬁ nal and binding’ and under the mandate given to it 
by the two countries will not be changed unless they agree to modify the terms of 
the arbitration itself, to submit their case to the International Court of Justice,62 or 
decide to enter into bilateral political negotiations. In the case at hand the prospects 
for any kind of breakthrough are slim.63 Ethiopia prevaricates about the Decision 
and about literal compliance with it, facing a problem created as a result of its 
perhaps too liberal attitude towards the border problem and its casualness about 
the wider, long-term interests of the country. Its proposal of the ‘Five Point Peace 
Plan’ in November 2004, suddenly accepting the EEBC Decision in principle but 
insisting on adjustments in the actual demarcation phase, was the last offer made. 
But Eritrea wants unconditional demarcation on the ground exactly following the 
lines on the EEBC map, without bilateral talks with Ethiopia about normalization 
or minor on-the-ground adjustments. It has constantly attacked the international 
community for its lack of pressure on Ethiopia. 
Since the end of the EEBC on 30th November 2007 (by self-imposed termina-
tion), the UNMEE mission in the border area has fared badly due to persistent 
hindering by the Eritrean government which is convinced of the Mission having 
outlived its usefulness. The way Eritrea went about progressively hindering and re-
stricting the UNMEE forces64 and challenging the international community shows 
a remarkable lack of respect for diplomatic mores. This has not won it any friends 
or convinced anybody of supporting its own position despite the fact of its, in prin-
ciple, more valid stance on the border issue than Ethiopia. 
61 See e.g., Kaldor, loc. cit. n. 1, at pp. 168-169.
62 As argued by McHugh, loc. cit. n. 43, pp. 209-239.
63 Cf. D. Jacquin-Berdal and M. Plaut, eds., Unﬁ nished Business. Ethiopia and Eritrea at War 
(Lawrenceville NJ, Red Sea Press 2004).
64 See UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s Special Report (3rd March 2008) on UNMEE and 
its current position (S/2008/145). He described the steps taken in December 2007 through to February 
2008 in trying to persuade the Eritrean authorities to lift their blockade of fuel supplies to UNMEE and 
their forcing the UNMEE troops out of the border zone, necessitating it to relocate its personnel. The 
UNSG had noted that the restrictions imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE were unacceptable and in breach 
of the fundamental principles of peacekeeping.
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In the conﬂ ict, the symbolic value of Badme, which the EEBC Decision, against 
the initial expectation of both sides, had placed in Eritrean territory (some 2 to 3 km 
from the border),65 has now been proven so strong for both regimes in place that 
a negotiated, reasonable solution to the ‘border crisis’ is not likely to be reached 
in the coming years. Ethiopia, supported by a large portion of its public opinion, 
adheres to the view that ex iniura jus non oritur, with iniura here meaning (see the 
EECC Award cited above) the opening of armed hostilities at Badme by Eritrea 
and its pursuing of war. Ethiopia may also be of the view that ex factis jus oritur, 
reinforced by its military victory in 2000. Eritrea says, with equal justiﬁ cation that 
pacta sunt servanda, supported by the mandate of the Algiers Agreement and the 
EEBC. Care for the fate of local people is not part of that.
Be that as it may, the spectre of war is ever there where Eritrea and Ethiopia 
are involved ﬁ ghting each other by proxy, in recent years enhanced by the So-
malia conﬂ ict.66 Any new armed conﬂ ict will obliterate the EEBC ruling and the 
Algiers Agreement. It is unfortunate that on account of its procedural aspects and 
its incomplete use of ‘applicable international law’ the EEBC, by order of the two 
parties that requested the arbitration as well as by its own volition, has sealed off 
the prospects for ﬂ exibility, amendment and compromise in the light of new infor-
mation or interpretation. International law not taking into account clear facts and 
realities on the ground – both of a political and human nature, has little prospect of 
being implemented.67 Instead, certainly in the case of the Ethio-Eritrean boundary 
decision, its painstakingly developed, normative precepts will be in danger of be-
ing overruled by those realities.
65 The main village of Badme (a name also used to indicate the wider area around it) is not the 
same as that of Yirga, despite news messages and the statements of several local people and other 
informants on which I based my observations in a previous article. See J. Abbink, ‘Badme and the 
Ethio-Eritrean border: the challenges of demarcation in the post-war era’, 58 Africa (Roma) (2003) 
pp. 219-231, which hereby stands rectiﬁ ed. The (Mai) Tomsa point (reference point 6 in the line on 
Map 10 (Western sector) of the EEBC Decision, p. 96) taken by the EEBC instead of the Mai Teb or 
the Sittona point appears to let Badme fall into Eritrea. As noted, it is an incorrect decision, unless one 
accords legitimacy to maps unilaterally drawn up by one interested party.
66 See T.E. Lyons, Avoiding Conﬂ ict in the Horn of Africa. U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eri-
trea (Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 21, Washington, DC, 2006).
67 L. Frey, ‘The Eritrea-Ethiopia dispute’, 2 International Affairs Quarterly (2005) p. 1 (online: 
<http://davisiaj.com/content/view/26/86/>) has spoken of the production of a ‘legal ﬁ ction’.
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